IT is expected that the train hijacking incident in Balochistan will trigger a robust response from the state — quite likely in the form of military action on several fronts. Nevertheless, discussions focusing on the political aspects of the crisis in the province, and how to address it, particularly regarding the initiation of dialogue, will persist, even if in subdued tones.
The debate will feature another significant element, ie, the role of external support for any military operation against the insurgents, focusing explicitly on securing diplomatic backing and logistical assistance. Three contexts will be particularly relevant. First, the recent warning issued by Baloch insurgents against China during their strategic realignment meeting a few weeks ago raises essential questions about how Beijing will respond, especially in terms of providing financial and logistical support to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations.
Second, Pakistan is unlikely to expect substantial material support from the US and its Western allies, not only due to political issues and the Ukraine conflict, but also because the West tends to sympathise with separatist movements, while adopting a different approach towards religiously motivated terrorism and extremism. Consequently, Islamabad will instead prioritise diplomatic backing to counter international lobbying by India, which seeks to promote the Baloch separatist narrative and restrict both the financial and political support provided by the Baloch diaspora to insurgents.
Third, there are historical precedents that suggest that external military support is pivotal. Pakistan previously received notable military assistance from the Shah of Iran during its counterinsurgency operations in the 1970s. Analysts are debating whether China will offer comparable support to Pakistan in its contemporary counterinsurgency operations, mirroring Iran’s role several decades ago.
The Baloch Liberation Army and other smaller insurgent groups have continuously targeted China’s nationals and its commercial and diplomatic interests in Pakistan. These insurgent groups, as mentioned at a meeting, have devised a strategy that intensifies terrorist activities, especially with regard to targeting CPEC and Chinese interests in Balochistan. China has shown increasing concern about the security of Chinese citizens in this country. It wishes to invest further in Pakistan but only if there’s a secure environment. Terrorist attacks against Chinese nationals, notably the BLA attack in Karachi last year targeting Chinese nationals as they exited the airport, strained bilateral ties temporarily. The tensions were later eased through confidence-building measures.
It’s uncertain how deeply China might engage in CT cooperation against the insurgency.
The BLA considers China an adversary due to its significant investments in Balochistan and close alliance with Pakistan. Given China’s willingness to help Pakistan in its counterterrorism efforts, questions have arisen regarding the possibility of China offering material support to the Pakistani armed forces specifically to counter the BLA. Historically, China has urged Pakistan to address terrorism, although practical cooperation has remained limited effectively. For example, in 2007, the Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad was initiated following a call from the then Chinese president Hu Jintao to Gen Pervez Musharraf, triggered by the abduction of Chinese health workers by students of the Jamia Hafsa madressah.
There have been similar speculations that China influenced Pakistan’s decision to launch Operation Zarb-i-Azb in North Waziristan in 2014. After the Karachi attack on the Chinese nationals, Beijing again expressed its expectations of Pakistan to undertake decisive action against the Baloch insurgents. However, China is hesitant to get directly involved in countering terrorism operations through visible financial and logistical support.
Pakistan has established a comprehensive security mechanism to protect CPEC and Chinese interests, including the creation of a special security division. Nevertheless, China assesses risks through its zero-tolerance lens against threats and expects allies to adopt similar stances.
Pakistan wants to take decisive action against the insurgents but faces economic limitations. A full-scale military operation would mean significant costs, when the state is already engaged in campaigns like Azm-i-Istehkam against the separatist insurgency in Balochistan and religiously inspired militancy in KP. Clearly, the economic and political implications of extensive military operations are considerable. However, state institutions are not willing to start a political process that could loosen their grip on power, as they believe it will lead to deeper crises. The political leadership can take political risks. But, its leaders, especially those enjoying powers, do not have a deep understanding of the crisis in Balochistan. Neither is the political leadership willing to take any action, as they believe it does not fall within their turf and is determined by the establishment.
Without political initiative, a kinetic approach is a significant remedy to addressing only the security threats. Chinese scholars often debate how China can enhance support beyond the existing framework, including equipment supply, intelligence sharing and joint security exercises. Although China once proposed deeper cooperation, such as deploying private security consultants to Pakistan, progress has been minimal due to Pakistan’s reluctance.
Will China reconsider enhancing security cooperation by supplying surveillance equipment, military hardware, or even partially funding the costs of a comprehensive military operation? It’s uncertain how deeply China might engage in the counterterrorism cooperation, especially given the threats from the BLA, the TTP, and allied groups targeting Chinese interests and contributing to regional instability. China fears an unsafe neighbourhood increases transnational terrorism risks and diverts strategic and political energies, negatively impacting its geo-economic objectives.
Historically, China has been hesitant to extensively support military campaigns in neighbouring countries, with exceptions like Myanmar, where it supports the military junta and mediates reconciliation with some militant groups. But despite possible hesitation regarding cost-sharing for a Pakistani military campaign, the potential for enhanced bilateral security cooperation remains viable.
China and Pakistan can develop a mutual cooperation framework excluding the direct involvement of Chinese private security personnel. Such a framework might involve intelligence-sharing mechanisms, training, and equipping Pakistani law enforcement — particularly the police and counterterrorism departments in Balochistan and Sindh — effectively. It could also include mutual learning experiences and joint border management protocols covering land, sea and air. Cooperation could further extend to addressing non-traditional security threats and serious organised crimes.
Ultimately, Pakistan’s immediate challenge is stabilising Balochistan. In such testing times, countries naturally turn to their allies for support.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, March 16th, 2025
